An economics analysis of manufacturing counterfeits and combating counterfeits;
“制假”与“打假”的经济学分析
The relationship of principal-agent between government and department for fighting against agricultural machinery forgers and of controlling- controlled between the department and agricultural machinery forgers in the game are analyzed respectively.
本文从博弈论和制度经济学角度,探讨了农机打假领域中政府与农机打假部门之间的委托-代理、农机打假部门与农机造假者之间的管制-被管制的博弈关系,并相应构建了两个博弈模型。
Private enforcement law is an important supply of public enforcement, but there are some legal barriers which discourage the function of private enforcement law.
以惩罚性赔偿金的运用为代表的民间打假是一个理论和实践中争议较大的问题。
本站部份资料来自网络或由网友提供,如有问题请速与我们联系,我们将立即处理!
Copyright © 2013-2024 杭州优配网络科技有限公司 All Rights Reserved 浙ICP备20019715号
免责声明:本站非营利性站点,以方便网友为主,仅供学习。合作/投诉联系QQ:1553292129